



Developing a Trustworthy Integrated Mission Management System for Autonomous Vehicles

Son Hoang (University of Southampton)
joint work with many others

Exploring Formal Methods for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (10/06/2025)

- ▶ Policing Function for UAV
 - ▶ Joint work between University of Southampton and Tekever Ltd.
- ▶ Integrated Mission Management System for Autonomous Vehicles
 - ▶ Joint work between University of Southampton and Thales, UK.
- ▶ Challenges and Opportunities

Formal Development of Policing Functions for Intelligent Systems


Uni. of Southampton:

T. Wilkinson, J. Snook, S. Hoang, M. Butler

Tekever Ltd.:


C. Bogdiukiewicz, X. Waldron, M. Paxton


ISSRE 2017



Route Validator

Architecture





Theories based on
Real



```
1 constants r len min_sep
2 axioms
3   "2 ≤ len"
4   "r ∈ 0 .. len - 1 → ROUTE_T"
5   "zero ≤ min_sep"
6 events
7   get_conflicts
8   any cflts where
9     "cflts = (⋃ m,n · m ∈ 0 .. len - 1 ∧
10              n ∈ m+1 .. len - 1
11              | route_pair_conflicts(r(m), r(n), min_sep))"
12 then
13   skip
14 end
```

Event-B Formal Specification

```
1 separation_conflicts_t *get_conflicts(route_t *r,
2   int len,
3   distance_t min_sep) {
4   ...
5   separation_conflicts_t *conflicts = sc_create();
6
7   for (int i = 0; i < len; ++i)
8   {
9     for (int j = i + 1; j < len; ++j)
10    {
11      if (r[i].id == r[j].id)
12      {
13        /* An aircraft is never in conflict with itself. */
14        continue;
15      }
16
17      route_pair_conflicts(conflicts,
18        r[i],
19        r[j],
20        min_sep);
21    }
22  }
23 }
24 }
```

Systematic translation into C

Some Experimental Figures



Integrated Mission Management System

Uni. of Southampton (School of Engineering & ECS):

J. Downes, S. Turnock, J. Scalan, M. Ferraro,
S.J. Ossont, D. Dghaym, A. Salehi-Fathabadi,
S. Hoang, M. Butler, E. Rogers

Thales UK:

J.Lam, B. Pritchard, C. Harding, J. Leech,
M. Shepheard


IMMS 2019 & 2022

Purpose



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QYpjZZsIe-A>

Scenario




Integrated Mission Management System




University of
Southampton

Flow Diagram






Route Validation



UAV Cameras



Challenges and Opportunities

- ▶ Not all safety properties can be specified/formalised
 - ▶ Combine with other techniques, e.g., metamorphic testing
- ▶ System complexity
 - ▶ Compositional verification
- ▶ Scalability of verification
 - ▶ Need abstraction
- ▶ Large Language Models (Challenge?/Opportunity?)

► Concepts of Design Assurance for Neural Networks (CoDANN)




Figure 8 — Global view of learning assurance W-shaped process, non-AI/ML component V-cycle process and safety assessment process

References I